We propose a methodology that facilitates a direct test of the homevoter hypothesis, which posits that homeowner/voter support for a public good project is positively related to the project's expected effect on property values. First, we estimate how events that indicate an increasing probability that the public good project will be undertaken impact local residential property values before the referendum is held. These pre-vote impacts are considered noisy signals to homeowners about the market's assessment of the net marginal benefits of the project. Second, we aggregate these market signals to the precinct level and relate them to precinct-level voting results concerning the proposed project. We apply this method to the 2004 referendum in Arlington, Texas, concerning a publicly subsidized stadium to host the NFL Dallas Cowboys. The analysis supports the homevoter hypothesis and establishes a possible methodology for future evaluations in this small but growing empirical literature.
Introduction and Motivation
Standard voting models assume voters show more support for public spending projects when the expected marginal consumption benefits exceed the marginal costs. When the net benefits of the project influences the value of voters' asset holdings, the resulting wealth effect will be among the factors influencing voting behavior. The capitalization of local public goods into house prices has been well established in the economics literature. 1 Both the models of Wildasen [2] and Sonstelie and Portney [3] reveal that voters prefer the level of a public good that maximizes the value of their house. If the public good level is not optimal from a purely consumption perspective, the voter can sell the house and move. 2 Voter support of local public goods or services which preserve or enhance house values has been coined the "homevoter hypothesis" by Fischel [5] .
There are just two related empirical tests of the homevoter hypothesis. Brunner, Sonstelie and Thayer [6] examine voter behavior in the State of California's 1993 school voucher initiative. The initiative would have subsidized private elementary and secondary schools, and hence would have decreased the willingness to pay for housing in quality public school districts.
Brunner, Sonstelie and Thayer estimate the premium or discount associated with each of the 74 school districts in Los Angeles County. They establish a negative correlation between the premium paid for housing and support for the school choice initiative, which suggests that homeowners who felt their property values would be harmed by the school choice initiative voted against the proposal. In a follow-up paper, Brunner and Sonstelie [7] use survey data from potential voters regarding the State of California's 2000 voucher initiative. Their finding that homeowners without school children but in good public school districts were less likely to vote 4 for the initiative than if they lived in inferior school districts lends further support to the homevoter hypothesis.
This paper provides the first direct empirical test of the homevoter hypothesis in the context of a large discrete project. We examine voting in a referendum for a new publicly subsidized stadium for the NFL's Dallas Cowboys in Arlington, Texas. The public subsidization of sports stadiums is a controversial issue, and the debate over whether a subsidy is justified is often finalized at the ballot box. Stadium proponents highlight the quality of life improvements and economic activity generated by new sports venues, thereby justifying subsidies on the basis of public benefits. Carlino and Coulson [8] , [9] contend that a stadium, or more specifically a franchise that plays in the stadium, can provide non-excludable public benefits such as civic pride and enjoyment from being a fan, for which residents may be willing to pay a premium. Tu [10] discusses jobs creation, increased local spending, and economic revitalization of depressed areas.
However, Coates, Humphreys and Zimbalist [11] note that referenda on stadium and arena subsidies have met with mixed results, suggesting that in some cases the majority of voters perceive the costs of publicly subsidized facilities to exceed the benefits. 3 Those critical of stadium subsidies counter that public benefits of new stadiums tend to be overstated ex ante, and that stadium subsidies primarily provide wealth transfers to wealthy team owners, wealthy players, and those fans who attend events in the new venue.
In this paper, we empirically test whether differences in property values associated with the stadium proposal were also associated with differences in voters' relative support for the proposal. On November 3, 2004 , the citizens of Arlington, Texas, were given the opportunity to 5 vote on a proposal to increase local sales and user taxes to contribute $325 million to the construction of a new, retractable roof stadium for the NFL's Dallas Cowboys. 4 The proposal was announced in early August of 2004 and, following the model of other successful referendum campaigns, the subsequent three month campaign for the Cowboys stadium focused on the benefits of hosting the Cowboys and the expected positive impact of a new stadium on the future development of the city. These claims were somewhat distractedly rebutted by a small group of anti-subsidy activists who argued against the stadium proposal as it was tendered to the voters.
The proposal to build a stadium for the Cowboys passed by a margin of 55 to 45 percentage points Our empirical strategy entails a two-step process. First, hedonic analysis of single-family residential property prices accommodates variations in property prices within the City of Arlington following two announcements that each increased the probability that a publicly subsidized stadium would be built in Arlington. Following the literature on local amenity effects, we employ a flexible distance specification that accommodates a non-monotonic but continuous house price surface. This specification allows for house prices to be affected differently at different distances from the proposed stadium site. The second step follows the applied public choice literature by relating precinct-level vote results to demographics and the estimated impacts of the two pre-vote announcements on local house prices. The research design allows us to test how expectations about the net benefits of a public good project, as reflected in the market prices for residential property, influence voter behavior. We do so by linking residential property values to an increasing probability that the public good project will be undertaken. If homeowners anticipate that the proposed public good project is causing a decrease (increase) in 6 property values, homeowners should be more likely to vote against (for) the proposal. Our empirical findings reveal that the direction and the magnitude of the house price effects explain voter behavior in a manner consistent with the homevoter hypothesis.
The paper expands on Brunner, Sonstelie and Thayer [6] in several important dimensions.
First, the capitalized house price effects from an uncertain future event proxy for the wealth effect homeowners would use in determining whether to support the proposed project.
Explaining voting outcomes through this wealth effect is a direct test of the homevoter hypothesis. Second, because we have two announcement effects, each of which increases the likelihood that a referendum will pass, we examine whether price effects under reduced uncertainty are more important in explaining voting outcomes. Finally, because both wealth effects and consumption effects vary with distance from the proposed stadium site, the spatial element plays prominently in the analysis.
In the next section we provide some background on the Dallas Cowboys search for a host community and the events leading up to the eventual passage of the referendum in Arlington. We then present the house price and voting analysis, respectively. These are followed by some robustness checks. The paper concludes with a discussion of issues involved with voting on large, discrete municipal projects.
Background
In (Campbell [12] and Nelson [13] ), local employment and income levels (Baade and Dey [14] and Coates and Humphreys [15] ) local tourism and hotel occupancy rates (Lavoi and Rodriguez [16] ), and local tax revenue (Coates [17] , and Depken and
Coates [18] ). In a different vein, several papers have investigated the impact of a new stadium on attendance (for example, Clapp and Hakes [19] ), team winning percentage (Quinn et al. [20] ), and the financial status of the franchise that plays in the stadium (Depken [21] ). The empirical results consistently show that the impact of a new stadium on local economies is dramatically less than advertised before the stadium is constructed and in some instances might actually be negative.
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The literature investigating stadium referenda themselves is relatively sparse. Agostini, et al. [23] were the first to estimate a vote-share model in the context of stadium referenda, focusing on 1989 and 1996 votes concerning public subsidization of a new stadium for the San Francisco Giants baseball team. In both votes, they find several demographic variables to be correlated with greater support for the stadium, including income, education, white-collar employment, and Asian heritage. Moreover, they find that the percentage of support for the stadium proposal increased by approximately 15% when the public subsidy was dramatically reduced in the 1996 proposal, which secured majority support. In an intra-city analysis, Depken [24] investigates how fan loyalty in professional baseball influences the outcome of stadium referendum outcomes in host cities using a probit analysis. He finds that teams with relatively stronger fan bases, i.e., greater fan loyalty, have a higher probability of securing public financing for a new stadium through the referendum process, but his analysis does not include many of the 9 demographics that are common to vote-share models. Coates and Humphreys [25] are closest in spirit to the study undertaken here and were the first to empirically investigate how proximity to a proposed stadium influences support for a stadium proposal. 
House Price Model and Results
Before the Cowboys stadium referendum two specific public announcements increased the probability that the stadium would be built in Arlington. We assume that homeowners observe signals from residential property transactions in their immediate neighborhood from which they can estimate the anticipated net effect of the proposed stadium on the market value of their house. If the market responds to the proposed public good project with an increase (decrease) in the price of residential property, everything else equal, the proposed public good can be viewed as contributing a net benefit (cost) to the local population. While homeowners do not receive direct signals about the value of their own home unless they put it on the market, they do observe transaction prices of properties in their immediate neighborhood. From these transaction prices, homeowners extract a (noisy) signal about whether the market as a whole expects the proposed project to convey net benefits.
The first stage of our empirical approach is an extension of Dehring, Depken, and Ward [26] in which five specific announcements concerning the broader search for a stadium site for the Dallas Cowboys in 2004 is investigated. Their inter-city analysis utilizes a differences-indifferences identification scheme within a hedonic pricing model to estimate the average house price effect within Arlington relative to surrounding cities. The announcement dates used in this study that pertain to Arlington are presented in Table 1 . Moreover, as we include only the city of Arlington in the empirical analysis, a difference-in-difference approach is not necessary.
The hedonic model of stadium amenity effects developed here features a piecewise linear distance function. This specification accommodates a non-monotonic but continuous house price surface as a function of the distance from the proposed stadium site. Since our dependent variable is the logarithm of price, we implicitly assume that the amenity effect is proportional to the house value otherwise. The model is: any appropriately-aged children living in the house could attend. 6 The model also includes a set of dummy variables which indicate the month in which the sale was negotiated assuming 30 days from date of negotiation to closing.
Our distance specification identifies price effects attributable to the proposed stadium.
Moreover, the flexible functional form allows the percentage change in price per mile to differ near the proposed stadium site and across announcements. The variable DSTAD is the greatcircle distance from the property to the proposed stadium site measured in miles. The maximum distance between a property in our sample and the proposed stadium site is 12 miles, therefore 12
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-DSTAD is the distance from the housing unit to the periphery of a circle having a 12 mile radius and the stadium as its mid-point. Thus β 0 indicates the percentage change in price from being an addition mile closer to the stadium during the pre-referendum announcements; β 0 reveals the effect of additional proximity to the stadium, rather than distance from the stadium.
Likewise, β 1 and β 2 measure the marginal effect of additional proximity after the first and second announcements. A positive coefficient suggests that properties closer to the stadium carry a premium relative to properties with similar characteristics further from the stadium. Ostensibly the premium indicates that the benefits of being near the stadium, including but not necessarily limited to proximity to the events in the stadium, proximity to any expected development around the stadium, and potential revenues from parking and other concessions, dominate the costs of being near the stadium, including but not limited to crowding, noise, or additional crime. A negative parameter coefficient would suggest the costs of being nearer the stadium outweigh the benefits of being nearer the stadium.
Following Tu [10] we allow for different effects associated with distance for the first three miles from the stadium. 7 The variables D 1 , D 2 , and D 3 indicate whether the property is within 1, 2, or 3 miles of the proposed stadium site, respectively. The piecewise linear distance function is therefore kinked at 1, 2 and 3 miles from the stadium site. The coefficients β 3 , β 6 , and β 9 reflect the additional percentage change per mile from being within 3, 2 and 1 mile of the stadium during the pre-referendum announcements, respectively. Together these coefficients reveal whether the stadium is placed in a local value "crater" or value "peak" on the larger
Arlington price surface. 7 While we test for price effects beyond 3 miles, none of these are significant, consistent with Tu.
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The price effects of interest concern the stadium announcements. The announcement variables, ANN j , j = 1, 2, 3 correspond to Announcement 1, 2 and 3 listed in Table 1 . 8 These variables indicate whether the property sale was negotiated following the relevant stadium announcement, assuming 30 days to closing. Thus, the remaining coefficients in the model reveal whether an announcement contributed any additional percentage change in price per unit of distance within a given distance from the proposed stadium site. Any citywide price effects from stadium announcements 1, 2 or 3 would be indicated by the significance of β 1 , β 2 , or β 3 , respectively. 9 The remaining 9 coefficients reveal the additional percentage change in price per mile closer to the stadium within 1, 2, or 3 miles from the stadium, respectively, following announcement 1, 2, or 3, respectively.
The data for the hedonic price model, which include sale price, date of sale, and housing Table 2 .
To estimate the hedonic pricing model we apply a logarithmic transformation to the sale price. Regression results are presented in Table 3 . The parameter estimates on property characteristics are as expected. 10 Turning to the results relating to distance from the proposed stadium site, before the initial announcement there was a small premium related to proximity to the stadium beyond 2 miles of the proposed stadium site. In the neighborhood around the proposed stadium site, however, the results suggest that the proposed location was in the center of a value crater on the broader price surface of Arlington. The results reveal an additional percentage decrease of 9% per mile closer to the stadium within 2 miles of the stadium, and another additional decline of 14% per mile closer to the stadium within one mile of the stadium.
This confirms our expectations that the proposed stadium site was in a local value depression.
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House price effects from announcements 2 and 3 are significant within 3 miles of the proposed stadium site, but not beyond 3 miles. These are graphically depicted in Figure 1 .
Following announcement 2, house prices decrease by 8.5% per mile with each mile closer to the stadium for houses within three miles of the stadium. Following the stadium vote, denoted Announcement 3, this price effect effectively reverses between 1 and 3 miles from the stadium. 10 House prices decrease with each additional year of age. Each additional square foot of living space contributes 0.03% to house price. Having a pool increases house price by 10%, while, each additional bath adds 6%. A parking space contributes 3% to price, while each additional story reduces price by 6% (controlling for house size). House prices are 0.66% higher with each additional percent of elementary students rated commendable on the TAKS test in the property's elementary school district. Finally, the lot area elasticity of value is 0.16, suggesting that prices increase with acreage but at a decreasing rate. 11 We ignore the coefficients on the distance variables that are not significant for the purposes of this discussion.
However, with within 1 mile of the stadium, house prices again decrease with proximity to the stadium. Specifically, following announcement 3, there is an additional decrease in house prices of 42% per mile with each mile closer to the stadium for houses within one mile of the stadium.
The cumulative loss in value for properties on the edge of the stadium is 15.4% before the vote, and 37% over the sample period. Overall, the results of the house price analysis reveal no access related net benefits from the stadium for the majority of property owners in the city of Arlington, but substantial costs to those in close proximity to the stadium. 
Vote Model and Results
In the second phase of the empirical analysis, we investigate whether the perceived costs and benefits of the referendum, as capitalized into house prices, affected voting behavior on the referendum. Specifically, we relate the percentage of 'YES' votes in a particular voting precinct to demographic characteristics of the population in that precinct and the average estimated effect of the various announcements concerning the stadium proposal on house prices in that precinct.
Of particular interest is whether the average effects on housing prices in a precinct can explain variation in voting outcomes. The homevoter hypothesis predicts a direct relationship between price effects attributable to the proposed public good project and support for the projects at the voting booth, i.e., homevoters will offer more support for public good projects that provide a greater net increase the value of their property. 12 It is important to note that the intra-city analysis does not reveal the total costs or benefits from the stadium announcement. This is because any costs or benefits borne equally by all Arlington residents are not testable in this framework. The intercity analysis of Dehring, Depken, and Ward [26] suggests that there was an average reduction in property values in Arlington of about 1.5% relative to the surrounding markets that would not bear any tax burden for the new stadium. A non-proportional sales tax effect, borne by Arlington residents and those who shop in the city of Arlington, may explain this discrepancy.
We generate the estimated dollar impact of Announcements 1 and 2 on the sales price of each property in our sample using the results from the hedonic regression model discussed above. 13 Variation in the impact of the announcements is identified through distance from the proposed stadium site and the interaction of distance with the various announcement periods.
We derive a dollar estimate of how much the stadium proposal cost homeowners during the two announcement periods in the summer of 2004. We utilize this information in a voting model similar to that in Brunner, Sonstelie, and Thayer [6] . 
where the dependent variable is the percentage of total votes cast in favor of the stadium proposal in precinct i, the θ's and α's are parameters to be estimated, and ω is a zero-mean stochastic error term.
We include the percentage of a precinct's population that was in another state in 1995 for two reasons, both of which suggest greater support for the stadium. An individual living in another state in 1995 was less likely to have participated in the 1991 referendum in Arlington to build a stadium for the Texas Rangers baseball club. Although the promised economic development around the stadium had not materialized by the time the Cowboys proposal was being considered, the memory of such promises would be strongest for those who were living in
Arlington at the time of the baseball stadium referendum. Moreover, a district with a greater 13 We use both significant and insignificant coefficients when calculating the estimated dollar impacts.
proportion of the population in another state in 1995 might have a more transient population in general, perhaps comprised of people who might not expect to be living in Arlington for the entire life of the proposed stadium, thereby reducing their expected tax contribution to the stadium. If this is the case, we would expect to see a greater level of support for the stadium proposal. We also include the percentage of the precinct's population over the age of 65, although the expected effect of an older population on stadium support is ambiguous. On the one hand, older residents are often on fixed incomes and are somewhat reluctant to vote for tax increases, but in this case those over 65 might have a lower expected contribution to the stadium.
The net effect of these influences is not clear.
Depken [27] estimated that (league-wide) professional football is a normal good. If this is also the case in Arlington, those with greater income are expected to attend football games in greater numbers and, relative to those who do not attend games in the new stadium, stand to earn more consumer surplus from the new football stadium if the proposal were to pass. Although those with more income might bear a greater tax burden, we expect that, on net, support for the stadium will be higher in precincts with w ealthier populations. Similarly areas with more unemployed individuals are less likely to anticipate large consumer surplus from a new stadium and are simultaneously more reluctant to vote for increases in potentially regressive sales taxes.
Therefore the greater the unemployment we expect less support for the stadium. The impact of racial composition on stadium support is ambiguous.
The primary variables of interest in this model are the distance of the precinct from the proposed stadium site, the percentage of a precinct's population that were homeowners, and the estimated impacts of the various stadium announcements on residential property values. The further away from the proposed stadium site, the lower the net benefits of the stadium. Therefore, we anticipate in general that the further the voting precinct is from the proposed stadium site, the lower the support for the stadium. Not all precincts in the city of Arlington had a house sell during a given announcement period. To accommodate this we create two dummy variables that take a value of one if there were no house sales during a given announcement period, denoted NOSALES1 and NOSALES2, respectively. For those precincts with no house sales, the dollar effects are coded as zero and the dummy variables differentiate between a price effect that equals zero and the absence of a price effect.
We Descriptive statistics of the 113 voting precincts in the city of Arlington employed in our regression model are reported in Table 5 . Average support for the stadium proposal throughout all of Arlington was 56.7 percent. However, there was considerable variation across precincts.
Twelve precincts offered less than 50 percent support for the stadium proposal; the least amount of support (43.4 percent) was in Precinct 2451, located approximately 3 miles from the proposed stadium site. Ten percent of the average precinct's population was in another state in 1995, approximately 6.75 percent of the population was older than 65, median household income was approximately $55,000, the unemployment rate averaged three percent, the average precinct was 64% white, the average precinct was 7.5 miles from the proposed stadium location, and 61 percent of the population owned their house.
We use standard ordinary least squares regression methods to estimate the voting model in a cross-sectional framework. The results of several different specifications are reported in Table 5 . In this model, support for the stadium declined as the precinct was further from the proposed stadium site which might reflect lower expected benefits from amenities local to the stadium. Models 5-7 repeat the estimation dropping the distance variable; there is some concern that the correlation between the distance from the proposed stadium site and the percentage of a precinct that are homeowners is sufficiently high to induce noise in the standard errors of the remaining parameter estimates. In Models 5-7 the results do not qualitatively change, however the percentage of the precinct's population that owned their own home is now negative and statistically significant. Combining the negative parameter estimates on home ownership with the positive parameter estimates on the average dollar effect of the first and second announcements and the positive parameter estimates on the dummy variables that indicate no house sales in a precinct suggests two things. First, property owners did not anticipate as high net benefits as non-property owners, perhaps because they feared a greater share of the tax burden or they considered themselves less mobile and therefore unable to leave the tax jurisdiction. Second, as houses sold for higher (reduced) prices in a particular precinct, support for the stadium proposal increased (fell).
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Robustness Checks
There might be concern that the results presented in Table 5 are driven by the level of turnout for the election rather than the impact of the announcements on property values. While the stadium proposal was coincident with the presidential election of 2004, it is possible that turnout was the variable which responded to the signals provided by the residential property market. Therefore, we test whether the results reported in Table 5 are confirmed when voter turnout is the dependent variable rather than percentage voting in favor of the stadium proposal.
We obtained information on the number of registered voters for 94 of the 113 precincts in our sample. Knowing the total number of votes cast in each precinct facilitates calculating the percentage of registered voters who participated in the stadium vote. We re-estimated the models in Table 5 replacing percent support with percent turnout. The results are reported in Table 6 . 
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The data for these votes were gathered from 24 special polling locations, all of which are normal polling locations during general elections. Individual precinct data were unavailable, as a single polling location typically served multiple precincts, and matching data from a special election to precinct level data is somewhat difficult. We therefore relate the voting behavior for a particular special polling location with the precinct in which it is located. The descriptive statistics for these four additional elections are reported at the bottom of Table 4 .
We re-estimate the models using percentage voting in support of the other proposals The results of these robustness checks are reported in Table 7a and Table 7b . In Table 7a we estimate two models for each of the alternative votes analyzed. Table 7b .
Only one price effect is statistically significant; that being for TransitTax1. Given that this is the only parameter out of 24 estimated parameters concerning property values in Table 7a and Table 7b , this significant parameter is within the bounds of convention and likely reflects a Type I error.
Overall, the models presented in Table 6 and Table 7 support the conclusion that our primary results reported in Table 5 are not spurious or that the results supporting the homevoter hypothesis are being caused by some unmeasured influence on voter behavior. Given the direct test of the homevoter hypothesis undertaken here, we find support for the hypothesis despite the fact that the stadium proposal passed.
Discussion and Conclusions
This paper adds to and expands on a relatively small but g rowing empirical literature
investigating the homevoter hypothesis. First, we incorporate capitalized house price effects from an uncertain future public good project in explaining local support for the public good project. Second, we are able to identify specific events that arguably increased the likelihood that public good project would be undertaken, and can therefore test whether price effects under 26 reduced uncertainty are more important in explaining voting outcomes. Finally, given the specific location of the public good project we investigate, wealth and consumption effects can both vary with distance from the proposed public project's location and we therefore incorporate spatial relationships in the analysis. This is the first paper investigating a large discrete public good project in the context of the homevoter hypothesis and also seems to be the first to provide a direct test of the hypothesis.
Our empirical approach entails identifying specific events which increased the probability that a large public good project would be undertaken (with a subsequent increase in local sales and use taxes), and estimating the impact of these events on local residential property values. We then combine the estimated price effects and local demographics to explain precinct-level support for the public good project. Increases in house prices associated with an increasing probability that the public project will be undertaken are used as (noisy) signals that the market anticipates the project to offer a positive net marginal benefit. The homevoter hypothesis posits that positive (negative) noisy signals should correspond to increased (decreased) support for the proposed public-good project.
We apply this methodology to the November 2004 referendum to build a stadium for the NFL's Dallas Cowboys in Arlington, Texas. At the time, voters in Arlington approved an increase in local sales and user taxes to contribute up to $325 million to the construction costs of a new stadium. In the months before the election, two distinct events occurred that arguably increased the probability that the stadium proposal would be accepted: the announcement that the mayor was in discussion with the team concerning a new stadium and the announcement that the city council had approved a city-wide referendum concerning the stadium proposal. We accommodate temporal and spatial variation in the effect of the potential stadium project by 27 allowing the impact of these two announcements to vary with distance from the proposed stadium site. We find that support for the stadium fell (increased) where property values fell (rose) after these two announcements, ceteris paribus. We also find that homeowners in general were less likely to support the stadium proposal.
However 
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These public benefits have proven difficult to measure and identify; most academic studies suggest the public benefits after a stadium is built are considerably less than those predicted before a stadium is built. However, to the extent that voters do not completely dismiss these claims as mere 'cheap talk,' such claims might influence the median voter's support for a stadium subsidy. Our results suggest that voters more susceptible to 'cheap talk,' and those with less experience with past similar projects, were more likely to support the stadium proposal.
A related explanation also stems from imperfect information in voting markets. Voters suggests that price changes associated with the stadium debate were conveyed in some fashion and altered the expected net benefits of the stadium. Future research in the context of stadium referenda and the homevoter hypothesis would add to our empirical understanding of how homeowners support proposed large, discrete, public good projects. b Based on election returns from 24 special polling locations within the city of Arlington. Table 4 . Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 4 . Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 1
The intra city-analysis reveals that the proposed stadium was in a localized value crater. There are no significant house price effects from announcement 1. Following announcement 2, house prices decrease by 8.5% per mile with each mile closer to the stadium for houses within three miles of the stadium. Following the stadium vote, denoted Announcement 3, this price effect reverses between 1 and 3 miles from the stadium. However, with within 1 mile of the stadium, house prices again decrease with proximity to the stadium. Over the sample period, there is a 37% decrease in price for those properties on the edge of the stadium.
